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PARTISAN LEAN OF STATES:
ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND POPULAR VOTE
ANDREY SARANTSEV
Abstract. We compare federal election results for each state versus the USA in 1992, 1994,
until 2018, to model partisan lean of each state and its dependence on the nationwide popular
vote. For each state, we model both its current partisan lean and its rate of change, as well
as sensitivity of state results with respect to the nationwide popular vote, using Bayesian
linear regression. We apply this to simulate the Electoral College outcome in 2020, given
even (equal) nationwide popular vote, as well as 2016, 2008, and 2004 nationwide popular
vote. Taking equal popular vote for two major parties, we find whether the Electoral College
is biased towards one of these parties.
1. Introduction
Numerous models aim to forecast nationwide popular vote (PV) in the USA presidential
elections. They derive it from economic data, foreign policy, ethnic composition and other
factors: the book [4] and articles [2, 5, 7, 12, 13]. In the USA, uniquely among developed
nations, the winner is decided by the Electoral College (EC), rather than PV; see [9].
The EC consists of 538 people, with each of the 50 states delegating the number equal
to its House and Senate members combined, and Washington, District of Columbia (DC)
delegating 3 members. (DC is not a state since it does not have representatives in the House
and the Senate.) For each state and the DC, its members of the EC must vote for the
winner of the popular vote in the state. (Exceptions are Maine and Nebraska; see Section 2.)
The current two-party system of Democrats and Republicans dates back to the Civil War
age, and the third-party candidates have never won a presidential election; only on a few
occasions, they won some EC votes. In case of winning 270 or more Electoral College votes
the candidate is declared to be the president. If there is a tie: Each major-party candidate
wins exactly 269 votes, then the decision is deferred to the House of Representatives.
This peculiarity of election system in the USA moved to the forefront since 2000, which
was the first time since 1888 when the winner of the Electoral College lost the popular vote
(that is, got lower % of votes than the other major-party candidate). Such possibility was
discussed in the book [1], published in 1991. In 2016, the same situation repeated. Both
times, the winners of the EC were Republicans. This stirred a debate in the media whether
the Electoral College system currently has a built-in bias against Democrats. It is impossible
to do full justice to this literature; let us mention as an example [6, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22].
Another feature of the USA electoral system is the division of states into ‘red’, ‘blue’, and
‘purple’. A ‘red’ state has a very high probability of being won by Republicans, so that its
EC members will vote for Republicans by a large margin. A ‘blue’ state is the opposite:
It is very likely to be won by Democrats, and the margin is likely to be large. ‘Purple’
states, otherwise known as ‘swing’ or ‘battleground’ states, have a significant probability
of being won by either party. This classification is somewhat informal, and there are no
generally accepted thresholds. In particular, political analysts often split states into more
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
04
44
4v
4 
 [s
tat
.A
P]
  2
 Ju
l 2
01
9
2 ANDREY SARANTSEV
than three categories: ‘Solid Democrat’, ‘Likely Democrat’, ‘Lean Democrat’, ‘Swing’, ‘Lean
Republican’, ‘Likely Republican’, and ‘Solid Republican’.
In the election season, American and international media often feature maps of the USA
with states colored in various shades of red, blue, and purple, as election prediction. For
example, California is considered a solidly blue state: It was won by Democrats in every
presidential election since 1992, and the margin is now overwhelming (over 20%). Conversely,
Texas is considered a solidly red state.
Cook Political Report www.cookpolitical.com created a somewhat more formal ver-
sion of this classification: Cook Partisan Voting Index based on the last two President
election, by comparing statewide vs nationwide election results. A popular web site 538
www.fivethirtyeight.com uses a similar version of this index. However, we would like to
make this research more formal and statistically rigorous. We would like to use not only
presidential, but other federal elections: House and Senate.
We classify states into solid R, lean R, swing, lean D, and solid D. We define the partisan
lean of each state and model its time evolution, as well as correlation with the nationwide
popular vote percentages. We use not only presidential elections (which happen every 4
years in the USA), but House and Senate elections (which happen every 2 years). We
collect publicly available data from the House Clerk, Federal Election Commission (FEC)
and Wikipedia, starting from 1992. See [15, 16] on political evolution of states.
For each of these elections: House, Senate, Presidential, take D and R, the numbers of
votes by major parties, and compute the quantity z = ln(D/R) for each state. Then regress
it upon the nationwide ln(D/R), and the year of election. We obtain both point estimates
and Bayesian posterior, given a non-informative Jeffrey’s prior. Then we simulate 2020 and
2024 EC given four different scenarios of PV:
• Even PV, D = R;
• 2016 PV, D = 48.2%, R = 46.1%;
• 2008 PV, D = 52.9%, R = 45.7%;
• 2004 PV, D = 48.3%, R = 50.7%.
We remark that in 2024, the EC will be different. Texas and Florida are projected to gain
3 and 2 votes respectively; Arizona, Colorado, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon each are
projected to gain 1 vote, New York state is projected to lose 2 votes, and Alabama, Illinois,
Missouri, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, West Virginia will each lose 1 vote.
We also simulate past elections in 2012 and 2016, given even PV. This allows us to
see whether the EC is biased towards Republicans (this is true if the win probability for
Democrats is significantly less than 50%). This is actually true for 2012 and 2016, but not
for 2020 and 2024.
Finally, we investigate which swing states are more important for winning, given each
scenario. That is, which of them can be most easily swung given additional resources. (The
answer is North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Florida, for most scenarios.)
We stress that our research is not a prediction of 2020 elections; for this, we need to
use polls, fundraising, endorsements, economic indicators, and other available data. Among
many books on this topic, see [20].
1.1. Organization. In Section 2, we describe the data collection and organization, including
some special data points which we had to modify for consistency. In Section 3, we introduce
our linear regression model. Section 4 is devoted to fitting Bayesian linear regression for each
PARTISAN LEAN OF STATES 3
state; and Section 5 contains simulations of the Electoral College and related discussions.
Section 6 concludes the article and proposes future research.
1.2. Acknowledgements. I am thankful to my undergraduate students Jaucelyn Canfield
and Franklin Fuchs for collecting the data and helping me code the program. I am also
thankful to my undergraduate student Akram Reshad for pointing to me the data source:
FEC, which made data collection much easier. I would also like to thank Professors Aleksey
Kolpakov and Thomas Kozubowski for useful discussion and pointing relevant literature.
2. Election Data
2.1. Data description. We collect statewide % of popular vote for each of the two major
parties, for each of the 50 states for each presidential, House, and Senate election since 1992.
A House election happens every two years. Each state is split into several congressional
districts, for each of which a representative for the House is elected for two years. The state
with the most districts is California (53). Several low-populated states (Alaska, Wyoming,
and others) have only one congressional district: district-at-large. In other states, districts
are numbered: California 1, . . . , California 53; and similarly for other states.
For each state, we sum votes in all congressional districts of this state, for each major
party. Then we divide these two numbers by the overall popular vote (for all major and
minor parties together) in this state. The quantity of such congressional districts and their
shape is determined by the population of the state relative to the USA. Each 10 years, after
Census, the number and the shape of these districts are recalculated. In particular, after the
coming 2020 Census, Texas is projected to gain 3 congressional districts.
Every state has two senators, which are elected statewide. Each senator has a six-year
term. All 100 senators in the Senate are split evenly into three so-called Classes: Class I,
Class II, and Class III, which determines their election years. This means that each state
has Senate elections every two out of three even years.
The President of the USA is elected every four years: 1992, 1996, 2000, etc. As described
in the Introduction, each state is assigned EC members, equal in number to the total sum
of House and Senate members. For the 48 states other than Maine and Nebraska, these EC
members vote for the popular vote winner in this state.
There is an issue of faithless electors, which break this rule. However, so far there were
only very few such electors, and this has not influenced the outcome. It is hard to model
the behavior of potential faithless electors, and we shall not attempt this.
Maine and Nebraska use a hybrid system: They assign two EC votes to the statewide
winner, and other EC votes to winners of congressional districts. This can lead to splits, for
example 2008, Nebraska 2 vs the state of Nebraska; 2016, Maine 2 vs the state of Maine.
However, the boundaries of the districts change with each redistricting, and thus we cannot
compare the same district in different years. For the purposes of this article, we simply
assume that Maine and Nebraska assign all EC votes to the statewide winner. This will
introduce an error to our analysis, but it is of order 1 electoral vote, which is not much.
Finally, we have a benchmark: nationwide popular vote. For a Presidential election, this
is self-explanatory. For a House election, this is the sum of votes in all 435 congressional
districts. A Senate election is not nationwide (as explained above, each state has Senate
elections 2 out of 3 even years). Thus we use the nationwide House PV of the same year.
We do not model DC because it overwhelmingly voted Democratic in recent elections.
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2.2. Data sources. The GitHub repository Electoral-College-Vs-Popular-Vote of the
user asarantsev contains data in data.xlsx: sheet RawData contains numbers or % of
votes D and R in each state in each election; sheet Logarithms contains ln(D/R); sheet EC
contains EC votes in each state for 2012–2020 (current) and 2024 (future), as well as state
population in 2000 and 2010 Census, and the Cook Partisan Voting Index (we compare it
with our own version of partisan lean index).
For 2018, we take the House and the Senate data from Wikipedia pages, which exist for
every state, as well as for the whole nation. For 2000–2016, the data is taken from the FEC:
https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/electionresults.shtml in Excel:
• 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016: Tables 2, 6, 7;
• 2006, 2010, 2014: Tables 4, 5;
• 2002: Tables 2, 3;
• 2000: Sheets 2, 4, 5.
For 1992–1998, the data is taken from the House Clerk web page:
• http://clerk.house.gov/member info/electionInfo/1998/Table.htm
• http://clerk.house.gov/member info/electionInfo/1996/Table.htm
• http://clerk.house.gov/member info/electionInfo/1994/94Recapi.htm
• http://clerk.house.gov/member info/electionInfo/1992/92Recapi.htm
2.3. Special elections. There are some elections for which we cannot literally take available
data, but have to modify it.
(1) A top-two primary system has two top vote-getters in the primary advance to the
general election, regardless of the party. Such system is used in Washington House
and Senate elections since 2008, and in California House and Senate elections since
2014. In 2016 and 2018 California Senate elections, this led to both Democrats as
general election candidates in Califorina. For these Senate races, we use the primary
election, summing votes for all candidates from the two major parties.
(2) For House races, same-party runoffs happened, too, but for less than half of districts
in each state, for each election. Since the general election has a much higher turnout
than the primary election, we consider the general election in this case more represen-
tative. In this research, we set the following rule: We ignore a House election if in at
least half of districts there was no candidate from either Democrats or Republicans.
(3) Louisiana has a system similar to California and Washington: There, the November
election takes the form of a jungle primary: All candidates run together, not separated
by party. If no candidate gets 50%, a runoff election is in December. We sum votes
for all candidates from the two major parties in both the jungle primary and the
runoff, if it happens, and divide these by the total vote.
(4) We ignore Louisiana House elections for 1996, 1998, 2002, 2012, 2014, and 2016: In
each of these years, in at least half of districts, runoff elections were one-party.
(5) We treat Bernie Sanders from Vermont and Angus King of Maine as Democrats.
Bernie Sanders took part in House elections for Vermont at-large district in 1992–
2004 and in Senate elections for Vermont in 2006, 2012, and 2018. Angus King took
part in Senate elections for Maine in 2012 and 2018. For each of these elections, we
sum the votes of Bernie Sanders or Angus King and a Democrat in the same race, if
such Democrat existed; and assign this percentage to Democrats.
There are some other elections which we have to ignore.
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(a) California (b) Nevada (c) Texas
Figure 1. President, House, Senate elections: ln(D/R) for D and R votes.
This regression differs from (1): We do not regress upon the nationwide PV.
(1) 2016 House election in Vermont at-large had Peter Welch, for both major parties: He
is a Democrat, but won the Republican primary on write-in votes.
(2) 2006 Senate election in Connecticut featured incumbent Joe Lieberman running (and
winning) as an independent, because he lost the Democratic primary. Same applies
to Lisa Murkowski in 2010, Alaska Senate race: She lost the Republican primary.
(3) The following Senate elections did not have a Democratic: 2010, South Dakota;
2002, Virginia; 2002, Mississippi; 2002, Virginia; 2006, Indiana; 2000, Arizona; 2014,
Alabama; 2004, Idaho; 2014, Kansas. In each case, there was no opposition, or other
candidates were not ideologically similar to Democrats.
(4) The following Senate elections did not have a Republican: 2002, Massachusetts;
2008, Arkansas. In each case, there was no opposition, or other candidates were not
ideologically similar to Republicans.
(5) The following House elections did not have a Republican for at least half of the
districts in the state: 2008, Vermont at-large; 2008, Arkansas 1, 2, 4; 2006, Rhode
Island 2; 1996 and 1998, West Virginia 1, 3; Massachusetts, 2000–2008, 2014, 2016.
(6) The following House elections did not have a Democratic for at least half of the
districts in the state: 2016, Arkansas 1, 3, 4; 1998, Nevada 2; 2012, Kansas 1, 3;
2002, Nebraska 1, 3.
3. Regression Model
We denote election years 1992–2018 by t = −13, . . . ,−1, 0, for convenience. We wish to
make the latest election year (2018, as of this article) to be t = 0.
Let S be the set of 50 states. Let E be the set of all 35 House, Senate, and President
elections. For each election e ∈ E, we denote its year by t(e), and the party vote percentages
nationwide by d(e) and r(e). Recall that we use House nationwide popular vote percentages
for the corresponding Senate election. For each state s, we denote elections used in this state
by Es. For a state s and an election e ∈ Es, we denote by ds(e) and rs(e) the percentage
of the statewide vote for Democrats and Republicans for each election. The corresponding
logarithms of ratios are denoted by
x(e) = ln
d(e)
r(e)
and ys(e) = ln
ds(e)
rs(e)
.
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We consider the following linear regression:
(1) ys(e) = αs + βsx(e) + γst(e) + σsεs(e), εs(e) ∼ N (0, 1) i.i.d. e ∈ Es.
Here, αs is the current partisan lean, βs is elasticity of the state: its responsiveness to changes
in the national environment (measured by x(e)), and γs is partisan lean rate of increase or
decrease. The two terms αs + γst(e) together make partisan lean of this state in election e.
We borrow terms from quantitative finance: A stock’s alpha is the excess return compared
with the whole market, and its beta is its sensitivity to changes in the whole market. We
find point estimates for αs, βs, γs, σs for each state s ∈ S.
Next, we simulate national elections. We do predictions for years 2020 (T = 1) and 2024
(T = 3), as well as back-simulations for years 2012 (T = −3) and 2016 (T = −1). We fix
nationwide PV percentages d(e) and r(e), and compute x(e) = ln(d(e)/r(e)). Democrats
win state s if
(2) αs + βsx(e) + γsT + σsεs(e) = ys(e) = ln
ds(e)
rs(e)
> 0
which has probability ps := Φ (σ
−1
s (αs + βsx(e) + γsT )), where Φ is the CDF of N (0, 1):
Φ(u) :=
1√
2pi
∫ u
−∞
e−z
2/2 dz.
Then we simulate each state, independently of others, and sum the corresponding EC votes
of Democrats. Repeating this simulation many times, we get the distribution of EC votes.
This, in turn, gives us the probability that Democrats win (getting more than 269 EC votes).
4. Parameter Estimates
4.1. Point estimates. For each state s ∈ S, estimates of αs, βs, γs, σs from (1), number
Ns of elections, and current EC votes ECs, are in Table 1, taken from output.csv.
• The reddest state in 2018, measuring by α, is Wyoming, α = −1.102.
• The bluest state in 2018 is Hawaii, α = 0.948.
• For 2020, the results above stay the same, measured by α + γ · t for t = 1.
• The most neutral state (with α closest to 0) in 2018 is Nevada, α = −0.0009.
• The most rapidly blueing state is Vermont, γ = 0.069.
• The most rapidly reddening state is North Dakota, γ = −0.128.
• The state with least change rate is Massachusetts, α = 0.0007.
• The state which is most sensitive to the national environment is Alaska, β = 2.29.
• The least sensitive state is Hawaii, β = 0.005.
• The states with the highest and lowest σ are Delaware and Washington, respectively.
4.2. Size effect. Let P0(y), P1(y) be the Census population of the state s ∈ S in year 2000
and 2010, respectively. Pearson correlation coefficient and the R2 for regression of lnP0(y)
vs lnσs are equal to ρ = −0.740 and R2 = 0.547. For lnP1(y) vs lnσs, these are ρ = −0.751
and R2 = 0.564. We see that small states have, on average, larger standard error.
4.3. Comparison with Cook Partisan Voting Index. The current state partisan lean is
αs for the state s. We did linear regression of the list of these 50 αs, s ∈ S, vs Cook Partisan
Voting Index (based on the last two presidential elections, 2012 and 2016). This dependence
is very strong, with R2 = 0.960 and Pearson correlation 0.980. However, we believe that α
is a better index, since it includes more data than from the two last presidential elections.
PARTISAN LEAN OF STATES 7
State s αs βs γs σs ECs # data
Alabama -0.778 0.864 -0.057 0.208 9 29
Alaska -0.480 2.334 0.032 0.508 3 30
Arizona -0.196 1.205 0.018 0.193 11 30
Arkansas -0.572 0.329 -0.067 0.291 6 27
California 0.562 0.664 0.038 0.119 55 31
Colorado 0.115 1.282 0.029 0.179 9 30
Connecticut 0.509 0.885 0.018 0.411 7 31
Delaware 0.328 2.305 0.035 0.773 3 29
Florida -0.215 1.677 -0.010 0.283 29 31
Georgia -0.315 0.983 -0.013 0.142 16 30
Hawaii 0.966 -0.030 0.022 0.344 4 31
Idaho -0.817 1.229 -0.022 0.403 4 30
Illinois 0.329 1.173 0.011 0.200 20 30
Indiana -0.235 0.944 -0.004 0.288 11 30
Iowa -0.083 1.414 0.018 0.317 6 30
Kansas -0.577 0.939 -0.004 0.284 6 29
Kentucky -0.576 1.061 -0.039 0.209 8 30
Louisiana -0.820 0.975 -0.097 0.517 8 30
Maine 0.159 0.574 0.003 0.522 4 30
Maryland 0.599 0.675 0.022 0.208 10 31
Massachusetts 1.045 0.212 0.016 0.585 11 29
Michigan 0.128 0.788 0.001 0.167 16 30
Minnesota 0.189 0.825 0.003 0.159 10 30
Mississippi -0.440 0.621 -0.024 0.372 6 29
Missouri -0.242 0.660 -0.009 0.316 10 31
Montana -0.307 1.017 -0.017 0.365 3 30
Nebraska -0.702 1.854 -0.008 0.480 5 30
Nevada -0.007 0.795 0.007 0.239 6 30
New Hampshire 0.039 1.54 0.023 0.215 4 30
New Jersey 0.279 0.599 0.018 0.118 14 30
New Mexico 0.367 0.862 0.034 0.295 5 30
New York 0.746 0.736 0.039 0.208 29 31
North Carolina -0.08 0.894 0.002 0.118 15 30
North Dakota -0.516 0.797 -0.068 0.493 3 31
Ohio -0.209 1.555 -0.008 0.146 18 31
Oklahoma -0.912 1.120 -0.049 0.194 7 30
Oregon 0.368 0.344 0.015 0.236 7 30
Pennsylvania 0.127 0.903 0.017 0.222 20 32
Rhode Island 0.623 0.835 0.008 0.462 4 29
South Carolina -0.403 1.243 -0.009 0.205 9 31
South Dakota -0.535 1.676 -0.055 0.502 3 29
Tennessee -0.595 0.977 -0.043 0.218 11 30
Texas -0.445 0.952 -0.017 0.173 38 30
Utah -0.745 0.596 -0.02 0.248 6 31
Vermont 0.836 0.656 0.043 0.565 3 29
Virginia 0.003 1.363 0.016 0.214 13 29
Washington 0.312 0.975 0.015 0.105 12 31
West Virginia -0.543 0.5 -0.138 0.576 5 30
Wisconsin 0.038 1.036 0.001 0.218 10 31
Wyoming -1.197 1.243 -0.073 0.314 3 30
Table 1. Regression Coefficients Estimates
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State s αs βs γs
California (0.486, 0.590) (0.594, 1.062) (0.027, 0.040)
Nevada (-0.140, 0.139) (0.069, 1.396) (-0.011, 0.025)
Texas (-0.543, -0.333) (0.469, 1.392) (-0.029, -0.003)
Table 2. 90% Confidence Intervals for Regression Parameters
4.4. Deficiencies of the regression normal model. Each state has only few observations,
at most 31 (14 House + 7 President + 10 Senate elections). Thus we cannot assume that these
estimates of α, β, and γ for each state are very precise. In particular, confidence intervals
are large. We computed them for confidence level 90%. They are in the file output.csv. As
we see, they are large, particularly for β.
Also, in output.csv we have p-values for Shapiro-Wilk normality test for regression resid-
uals of each of the 50 states; and 21 of them have p < 5%. Therefore the residuals are not
normal (5% of 50 is 2.5, which is far less than 21).
4.5. Bayesian analysis. To account at least to some extent for these model deficiencies, we
use Bayesian linear regression. For background, see the textbook [14]; we also found useful
[3, Chapter 4]. Assume a non-informative prior for each state s ∈ S:
(3) pis(αs, βs, γs, σ
2
s) ∝ σ−2s .
The symbol ∝ stands for “proportional”. The term non-informative refers to the fact that
we do not use any information (such as empirical mean) in this distribution (3). This prior is
improper: That is, the integral of this density over all possible values is infinite. This seems
to be a contradiction in terms: A probability distribution must integrate (or sum, if it is a
discrete distribution) to 1. But we can still use this prior from (3) in Bayesian analysis.
The next step is to compute the likelihood L(ys(e), e ∈ Es | αs, βs, γs, σ2s). This is a
product of Gaussian densities. We get posterior distribution from the Bayes’ formula:
(4) p(αs, βs, γs, σ
2
s | ys(e), e ∈ Es) ∝ L(ys(e), e ∈ Es | αs, βs, γs, σ2s) · pis(αs, βs, γs, σ2s).
From the choice of a prior in (3), the posterior distribution is already known explicitly, see
for example [14, Chapter 9] or [3, (4.8)–(4.10)]. Let us introduce the following notation:
• inverse χ2 distribution Invχ2n(c) with n degrees of freedom, scale parameter c, and
density (with Γ(·) the Gamma function):
f(x) =
1
Γ(n/2)
(n
2
)n/2
cn · x−n/2−1 exp
(
−nc
2x
)
;
• multivariate d-dimensional normal distribution Nd(µ,Σ) with mean µ and covariance
matrix Σ, with density
f(x) = (2pi det(Σ))−d/2 exp
(
−1
2
(x− µ)TΣ−1(x− µ)
)
;
• ns, the number of elections for state s;
• a 3×3 matrix Ms =
[
1 x t
]
, where 1 is a vector of ns unit numbers, x is the vector
of the quantities x(e) for each election e valid for the state s, and t is the vector of
the times of these elections.
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(a) αs (b) βs (c) γs
Figure 2. Histograms of αs, βs, γs for Nevada
Then the posterior distribution from (4), as known from [14, 3], is
p(αs, βs, γs | σ2s) = N3((αˆs, βˆs, γˆs), σˆ2s(MTs Ms)−1),
p(σ2s) = Invχ
2
ns−3(σˆ
2
s).
(5)
One can show that the posterior (unconditional) marginal distribution of (αs, βs, γs) is mul-
tivariate Student, with heavy tails. Simulated parameters α, β, γ for Nevada are given in
Figure 2. One can compute 90% confidence intervals (x5%, x95%) with xα the α-quantile.
These coincide with confidence intervals from the file output.csv, given in Table 2 for three
out of 50 states.
5. Electoral College Simulations
We simulate each σs, then αs, βs, γs, for each of the 50 states s ∈ S. Then we simulate the
nationwide result in the following 6 scenarios:
(A) 2020 election with even PV: D = R = 50%;
(B) 2020 election with 2016 PV: D = 48.2%, R = 46.1%;
(C) 2020 election with 2008 PV: D = 52.9%, R = 45.7%;
(D) 2020 election with 2004 PV: D = 48.3%, D = 50.7%;
(E) 2024 election with even PV;
(F) 2024 election with 2016 PV.
For each scenario, we repeat this simulation 40000 times. Probabilities of Democrats
winning each state are in the file stateProb.csv. Histograms for EC votes are in Figure 3.
Red vertical lines show 269 votes: winning threshold. For each scenario, we compute the
probability for Democrats winning EC (by getting more than 269 EC votes): Area to the
right of the red line.
Electoral maps for these 6 scenarios are given in Figure 4. These maps are created us-
ing mapchart.com. We classify states by p (the probability of Democrats winning) in 5
categories, similarly to the New York Times and other news agencies:
• p > 90%: solid D, dark blue;
• 70% < p < 90%: lean D, light blue;
• 30% < p < 70%: swing states, green;
• 10% < p < 30%: lean R, yellow;
• p < 10%: solid R, red.
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5.1. Evolution of the Electoral College bias. If we simulate the EC for even PV in
2012, 2016, 2020, 2024, then Democrats’ win probability is 42.4%, 46.2%, 50.2%, 49.9%,
respectively. Thus the EC was biased in favor of Republicans in 2012, but much less so in
2016, and the bias will disappear in 2020 and 2024.
For previous elections: 2012 with actual 2012 PV, and 2016 with actual 2016 PV, we
have Democrats’ EC win probabilities 88.5% and 73.6%, respectively. Thus we see that the
Democrats’ lead in 2016 was less robust than in 2012. This is consistent with some elections
predictions, see for example fivethirtyeight.com: 90.9% and 71.4%, respectively, for final
election predictions on the Election Day morning in 2012 and 2016.
Let us discuss whether the EC bias (deviation from 50.0%) is due to statistical error.
Assuming that the EC is, in fact, unbiased, the standard significance test for the fraction of
simulations (out of N = 40000) in which Democrats win gives the interval 49.68%− 50.32%
for significance level p = 0.05. The results of 2012 and 2016 fall outside this interval. Thus
in these scenarios, the EC is really biased towards Republicans.
5.2. State-by-state highlights. We summarize the table of state-by-state win probabilities
in these 6 scenarios from stateProb.csv; see also Electoral College maps in Figure 4.
• The safest states for Democrats are California and New York, with win probability
greater than 99.9%. Hawaii, Maryland, Washington are also very safe for Democrats,
with probability greater than 99%.
• The safest state for Republicans is Oklahoma, with win probability greater than
99.9%. Alabama and Idaho are also safe, with win probability greater than 99%.
• Even though the media discussed the idea of turning Texas blue, see for example
[17], Democrats win Texas in 2020 for even or 2008 PV only with probabilities 1.0%
and 4.9%, respectively. Thus the path to EC win for Democrats does not lie through
Texas. Instead, they should follow a traditional path through Midwest and Northeast,
trying to get back the states that Republicans won in the 2016 presidential election.
We discuss this below when we speak of state importance coefficients.
• The states with closest to 50% win probability: Nevada for 2020 and 2024 election
with even PV, Iowa for 2020 and 2024 election with PV as in 2016, New Hampshire
and Arizona for 2020 election with 2004 and 2008 PV.
• For the even nationwide PV, the states with the most likely D or R win in 2020 are
not the same as the states with the strongest partisan lean measured by α (2018,
T = 0) or α+ γ (for 2020, T = 1). This is due to the fact that standard errors σ are
different from state to state, and these win probabilities depend on σ too.
5.3. Electoral College maps for various scenarios. Here we shall analyze the maps and
states’ ratings in Figure 4. In particular, how states’ ratings change from 2020 election with
even PV to other scenarios. The letters below correspond to subfigures in Figure 4.
(A) Except Nevada, all swing states in the Northeast and Midwest: Virginia, Pennsyl-
vania, Maine, New Hampshire, Iowa, Wisconsin. Although Ohio and Florida went
D in 2008 and 2012, we rate Ohio solid R and Florida lean R. But Michigan and
Wisconsin (two states which were crucial for 2016 election) are leaning D. We wish
to see more than one election won by R in Michigan and Wisconsin to conclude they
became swing states. Conversely, we rate Arizona, Montana, Mississippi, and the
Dakotas only lean R, despite them voting R in all presidential elections since 2000.
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(a) 2020, PV even, P = 50.2% (b) 2020, PV 2016, P = 75.9%
(c) 2020, PV 2008, P = 99.1% (d) 2020, PV 2004, P = 23.3%
(e) 2024, PV even, P = 49.9% (f) 2024, PV 2016, P = 74.1%
Figure 3. Democrats’ EC votes and win probability P , given nationwide % PV
(B) Since 2016 PV was in favor of Democrats, the Electoral College map becomes more
Dem-favorable as compared to (A). Arizona, Florida, North Carolina change from
lean R to swing, New Mexico changes from lean D to solid D, Pennsylvania and New
Hampshire change from swing to lean D, Ohio changes from solid R to lean R.
(C) Year 2008 was even more in favor of Democrats than 2016, thus the map in (C) shifts
to Democrats compared to (B). Ohio, Indiana, Montana switch to swing from lean
R; Colorado, Delaware, and Pennsylvania switch from lean D to solid D; Virginia
and North Carolina switch from swing to lean D; South Carolina and Georgia switch
from solid R to lean R.
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(a) 2020 with even PV (b) 2020 with 2016 PV
(c) 2020 with 2008 PV (d) 2020 with 2004 PV
(e) 2024 with even PV (f) 2024 with 2016 PV
Figure 4. Electoral Maps for 2020 and 2024 given nationwide PV
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Scenario Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3
2020 with even PV NC (55) PA (54) FL (30)
2020 with 2016 PV NC (65) PA (44) FL (36)
2020 with 2008 PV NC (50) OH (49) FL (40)
2020 with 2004 PV PA (57) NC (39) VA (24)
2024 with even PV NC (64) PA (49) FL (31)
2024 with 2016 PV NC (70) PA (38) FL (37)
Table 3. Most Important States and Importance Coefficients
(D) Year 2004, on the contrary, was more favorable to Republicans. Thus the map
becomes more R-leaning as compared to the map from (A): Colorado and Michigan
become swing states, and West Virginia switches from lean R to solid R.
(E) This map is similar to (A), but New Mexico is solid D instead of lean D, West Virginia
is solid R instead of lean R, and North Carolina is swing instead of lean R.
(F) This map is more favorable to Democrats than (E): Colorado and Delaware change
to solid D, Ohio changes from solid R to lean R, Pennsylvania and New Hampshire
switch from swing to lean D, and Florida switches from lean R to swing.
5.4. Pivotal states. Let us discuss on which states should the parties focus their resources,
given expected nationwide PV. For the sake of convenience, we shall discuss this from the
viewpoint of Democrats; but since elections are a zero-sum game, the same analysis applies
to Republicans. Assume Democrats can increase the αs of this state to αs + dαs. Then the
probability of Democrats winning this state has changed
from Φ
(
σ−1s (αs + βsx(e) + γst)
)
to Φ
(
σ−1s (αs + dαs + βsx(e) + γst)
)
,
or, in other words, by
ϕ(αs + βsx(e) + γst, σs) · dαs,
where the normal density ϕ(x, σ) is defined by
ϕ(x, σ) :=
∂
∂x
Φ(x/σ) = σ−1Φ′(x/σ) =
1√
2piσ
exp
(−x2/2σ2) .
Thus the expected rate of gain in Electoral College votes per change dαs is
Is := ϕ(αs + βsx(e) + γst, σs) · ECs,
where ECs is the number of EC votes in state s. This importance coefficient Is is calculated
for each state s ∈ S, for all 6 scenarios in the file importance.csv. In Table 3, we list the
three most pivotal states together with their importance coefficients.
6. Conclusion
We found the partisan lean of each state, its time dynamics, and its dependence of the
national political environment, using Bayesian linear regression of statewide election PV vs
election year and national PV. To test whether the EC is biased, we set the equal major
party nationwide PV, and simulate the EC votes. In 2012 and 2016, the EC was biased
towards Republicans, but in 2020 and 2024, it will be unbiased.
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Our version of PVI (partisan voting index) almost coincides with Cook PVI, and our
back-casts for Presidential elections in 2012 and 2016 closely match final predictions from
FiveThirtyEight. Small states have significantly higher variance than large states.
Again, we emphasize that this model is very simple. We do not pretend to describe voting
behavior and its change over time in a comprehensive way. To this end, we need polls, ethnic
and income composition data, etc. Some references with research along these lines are cited
in the Introduction.
Subsequent research might focus on more sophisticated models, which include ethnic and
economic statewide data, or the power of incumbency. Other possible lines of research:
(a) make sense of unusual elections which we disregarded in our analysis (see Section 2);
(b) include state and local elections (county and city councils, governors, state legislatures,
judges); (c) capture correlations between states with similar ethnic and economic patterns,
such as Wisconsin and Michigan, or Nevada and Arizona; (d) study the size effect further
(whether large state vote differently than small ones); (e) model Maine and Nebraska voting,
since these states split their EC votes.
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